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TAKE US BACK TO THE BALL GAME:
THE LAWS AND POLICY OF PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS TICKET PRICES
Nathan R. Scott*
The prices of professional sports tickets have skyrocketed in recent years, depriving
many fans of the time-honored tradition of taking theirfamilies out to a ball game.
This Article argues that legal reform and political action are appropriate responses
to these soaring prices.
First, the Article rebuts the threshold objection that economics alone justify current
ticket prices. Professional sports teams reap a windfall from the public through
corporate welfare, special-interest legislation, and favorable antitrust and tax
laws. This preferential legal treatment undercuts the argument that teams are sim-
ply charging, or should charge, what the market will bear. In addition, teams
cannot blame ticket prices on high player salaries, because the market for tickets is
economically distinct from the market for players.
Next, the Article evaluates four possible legal or political responses to ticket prices:
regulating professional sports leagues, eliminating their preferential legal treat-
ment, taking individual teams through eminent domain, and encouraging local
team ownership. It concludes that fans will be best able to keep tickets affordable by
encouraging local governments, which have spent billions of dollars on stadium
construction, to consider buying teams of their own.
INTRODUCTION
The family outing to the local big-league game, once a staple of
American life, is being lost. Ticket prices to professional sporting
events have skyrocketed beyond the reach of the average fan. Fans
who paid $1.50 as a child to watch their favorite team must now pay
$150 or more to bring their children to a game. Even these steeply-
priced tickets are becoming harder to find, as many teams now
require fans to purchase season tickets or personal seat licenses.
Fans also find themselves competing for stadium space with corpo-
rations who can afford $100,000 or more for luxury boxes.
* Appellate Court Attorney, California Court of Appeal. BA., University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles; J.D., Harvard Law School. I thank my father, John Scott, for suggesting this
topic; Paul C. Weiler, HenryJ. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, for encourag-
ing and reviewing an earlier version of this article; and my wife, Mary Scott, for her support.
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Despite the growing commentary on sports and the law, the
problem of soaring ticket prices has attracted relatively little aca-
demic attention. The lack of scholarly commentary is likely due to
two common, but flawed, perceptions. The first misperception sees
ticket pricing as solely an economic phenomenon, not a legal is-
sue. This view overlooks the windfall professional sports teams gain
through preferential legal treatment, such as special interest legis-
lation and court-sanctioned monopoly status. The second
misperception sees soaring ticket prices as necessary financial off-
sets to higher player salaries. This assessment fails to recognize that
the economic market for ticket prices and the economic market
for player salaries are largely unrelated.
This article explores the ticket-pricing problem, rebuts the con-
ventional wisdom that the problem is not a legitimate legal issue,
and suggests possible legal responses to make ticket prices afford-
able to the regular fan. It concludes that local government
ownership of professional sports teams may best protect fans' abil-
ity to take their families out to the ball game.
I. ASSESSING THE TICKET PRICING PROBLEM
Is there a "problem" with professional sports ticket prices? There
is for the regular fan, as it is now "standard practice for teams to
target affluent professionals as their primary clientele and to
charge prices that are beyond the means of average working fami-
lies. Middle and lower-income fans are thus being priced out of the
game."' Part L.A reviews the soaring ticket prices in the four major
professional sports leagues: Major League Baseball (MLB), the Na-
tional Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association
(NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL). Part I.B analyzes
the growing prevalence of premium seating, which further prices
regular fans out of the game.
A. The Current State of Professional Sports Ticket Prices
When Curly Lambeau's football team (sponsored by the Indian
Packing Company) first took the field in 1919, he literally passed a
1. Brian Cheffins, Playing the Stock Market: "Going Public" and Professional Sports Teams,
24J. CORP. L. 641, 679 (1999) (citing Dan McGraw, Big League Troubles, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.,July 13, 1998, at 40).
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hat among spectators to raise money. By 2004, the average ticket
to a Green Bay Packers game cost $54.40.s This price did not in-
clude $25 for parking.4 The Packers raised their ticket prices for
the 2005 season, and now the cheapest seats will cost $54.5 Fans wish-
ing to watch a game on the "frozen tundra of Lambeau Field" in
heated comfort can pay hundreds of dollars more for an indoor
club seat-the exact price depends on the terms of the team's
multi-year leases with its season ticket holders.6
Despite the price hike, Green Bay Packers's tickets are a bargain
compared to tickets for the New England Patriots. The average
ticket to a New England Patriots game cost $75.33 in 2004, not in-
cluding $35 for parking.7 At least fans who could afford $110 to
watch the Patriots got to watch a championship team, winners of
three of the last four Super Bowls.8 Fans of the mediocre Kansas
City Chiefs (7 wins, 9 losses in 2004), Washington Redskins (6-10),
New York Giants (6-10), and Chicago Bears (5-11) still paid more
than $65 for the average ticket.9 Even the hapless San Francisco
49ers, who won 2 games and lost 14 in 2004, charged $64 for the
average ticket.10
Overall, the average NFL ticket cost $54.75 in 2004." Out of all
of the professional sports, fans pay the highest prices for NFL
tickets, as each team plays only eight regular-season home games.12
Prices are somewhat lower in the NBA or NHL, whose teams play
41 regular-season home games.13 The average ticket to an NBA
2. Packers.com, Green Bay Packers: Birth of a Team and a Legend, http://
www.packers.com/history/birth-of_ a_teamand_a_legend (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
3. TEAM MKTG. REPORT, FAN COST INDEX: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 2004 (2004),
available at http://www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm?page=fci-nfl_04.cfm [hereinafter FAN
COST INDEX, NFL 2004].
4. Id.
5. Tony Walter, Packers Boost Ticket Prices $4, GREEN BAY PREss-GAZETrE, Mar. 9, 2005,
at AL, available at 2005 WLNR 3802323 (Westlaw).
6. Id. The "frozen tundra" is a moniker for Lanbeau Field made famous by John
Facenda, the legendary narrator for NFL Films programs. Fans have bestowed upon
Facenda his own impressive nickname-"the voice of God." Eric Fisher, Branching Out: NFL
Films Does More than Just Football Games, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at CO.
7. FAN COST INDEX, NFL 2004, supra note 3.
8. Bob Ryan, "D"for Dominance, Not Dynasty, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2005, at El.
9. FAN COST INDEX, NFL 2004, supra note 3; see also NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 2004
REGULAR SEASON STANDINGS (2004), available at http://www.nfl.com/standings/2004/
regular [hereinafter 2004 NFL STANDINGS].
10. 2004 NFL STANDINGS, supra note 9; FAN COST INDEX, NFL 2004, supra note 3.
11. FAN COST INDEX, NFL 2004, supra note 3.
12. Stephen M. Carr & Timothy F. Cummins, Professional Sports Franchises Still Present
Unique Valuation Problems, 5 VALUATION STRATEGIES 6 (2001), available at 2001 WL 1468679.
13. Id.
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game cost $45.28 in 2004; an average NHL ticket cost $43.57.14 The
NBA's Los Angeles Lakers charged the highest average ticket price
in professional sports: $75.40.'"
These highly-priced tickets just get you in the door: the cost of
actually attending an NFL, NBA, or NHL game is much higher.
The Fan Cost Index (FCI) estimates the total cost for a family of
four to attend a game, including typical expenditures on parking,
tickets, concessions, and souvenirs. 6 The 2004 FCI was $321.62 for
17NFL games, $263.44 for NBA games, and $253.65 for NHL games.
Seven NFL teams had a 2004 FCI above $350; seven NBA teams
and five NHL teams had a 2004 FCI above $300.18
Even Major League Baseball, historically the most affordable of
the four major professional sports leagues because its teams play
the most home games, is pricing its regular fans out of the ball-
park." The average ticket to a 2004 MLB game cost $19.82, and the
average 2004 FCI for a family of four to watch a MLB game was
$155.71.20 Fans of the 2004 World Series champion Boston Red Sox
paid more than $40 for the average ticket, the highest price in
MLB.21 Fans of the Philadelphia Phillies paid $26.08 for the average
ticket in 2004, only to watch their team finish 10 games out of first
place in the National League's East Division.22 The $26.08 ticket
price represents a whopping 51.26% increase over the Phillies's
14. TEAM MKTG. REPORT, FAN COST INDEX: NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 2004-
2005 (2005), available at http://www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm?page=fci_nba04-05.cfm
[hereinafter FAN COST INDEX, NBA 2004]; see also ThAM MKTG. REPORT, FAN COST INDEX: NA-
TIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 2003-2004 (2004), available at http://www.teamimarketing.com/
fci.cfm?page=fcinhl_03-04.cfm [hereinafter FAN COST INDEX, NHL 2004].
15. FAN COST INDEX, NBA 2004, supra note 14; cf FAN COST INDEX, NFL 2004, supra
note 3; FAN COST INDEX, NHL 2004, supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., FAN COST INDEX, NFL 2004, supra note 3.
17. Id.; FAN COST INDEX, NBA 2004, supra note 14; FAN COST INDEX, NHL 2004, supra
note 14.
18. FAN COST INDEX, NFL 2004, supra note 3; FAN COST INDEX, NBA 2004, supra note
14; FAN COST INDEX, NHL 2004, supra note 14.
19. Daniel C. Glazer, Can't Anybody Here Run This Game?: The Past, Present and Future of
Major League Baseball, 9 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 339, 400 (1999) ("MLB plays at least twice as
many games per season as any other professional sport, in stadiums with seating capacities
ranging from 30,000 to almost 60,000. ... ").
20. TEAM MKTG. REPORT, FAN COST INDEX: MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 2004 (2004),
http://www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm?page=fci-mlb2004.cfm [hereinafter FAN COST
INDEX, MLB 2004].
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2004 FINAL STANDINGS (2004), available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/standings/final2004.jsp [hereinafter 2004 MLB
STANDINGS].
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2003 ticket prices, when the Phillies finished 15 games out of first
place.23
The dramatic increase in professional sports ticket prices is a
surprisingly recent development, as exemplified by MLB ticket
prices. MLB ticket prices were remarkably consistent until the early
1990s. 24 In 1920, the average MLB ticket cost $1.00.25 By 1986, the
average MLB ticket cost $6.70.26 But the real price of the average
MLB ticket, adjusted for inflation, actually fell during that time.27
Expressed in 1967 dollars, the price of the average MLB ticket fell
from $2.88 in 1939 to $1.98 in 1986.28 The startling revelation is
that "average ticket prices during the 1980's were cheaper in real
dollars than at any other time since the Great Depression.
2 9
But MLB ticket prices have skyrocketed since the early 1990s.
The average Red Sox ticket price has almost doubled in price since
1998, when the average Red Sox ticket cost $24.05." On a whole,
the average MLB ticket price more than doubled since 1990, from
$7.95 in 1990 to $19.82 in 2004-a 149% increase.3' By way of
comparison, the average movie ticket price rose only 47% during
the same time, from $4.22 in 1990 to $6.21 in 2004.2 In fact, recent
professional sports ticket price increases are triple the inflation
33
rate.
23. FAN COST INDEX, MLB 2004, supra note 20; MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2003 FINAL
STANDINGS (2003), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/standings/mlb_
standings_2003_season.jsp.
24. Glazer, supra note 19, at 401.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Baseball Tickets Continue to Rise, O.C. REGISTER (Orange County, Cal.), Apr. 2,
1999, at Sports 6; see also FAN COST INDEX, MLB 2004, supra note 20 (stating the 2004 Red
Sox ticket price as $40.77).
31. SeeANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL & BILLIONS 52 (1992); see also FAN COST INDEX,
MLB 2004, supra note 20.
32. Nat'l Ass'n of Theater Owners, Average U.S. Ticket Prices, www.natoonline.org/
statisticstickets.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
33. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public Finance of Sports Stadia: Controversial But Permissible
... Time for Federal Income Tax Relieffor State and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135,
156 (2002).
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B. The Explosion of Premium Seating
Professional sports teams benefit from a "new economics-fewer
seats, more expensive seats, and a catering to corporate America."
34
Premium seating-including expensive field-level seats, "club"
seats, and luxury boxes-is sweeping through sports, as teams
"search[] for innovative and elaborate ways to transform fan inter-
est and loyalty into dollars."35 For example, in 2000 the Los Angeles
Dodgers renovated Dodger Stadium by adding 601 "Dugout Club"
seats at field level behind home plate, 500 extra seats along the
foul lines, and 33 luxury suites. 6 Only five years later, this premium
seating proved outdated. Before the 2005 season, new Dodgers
owner Frank McCourt added 300 more Dugout Club seats behind
home plate and 1300 more field box seats along the foul lines.
The new field box seats cost between $40 and $125; the new Dug-
out Club seats cost between $275 and $400.8 The Dodgers told one
long-time fan, reportedly the very first Dodger Stadium season
ticket holder, that he could upgrade his formerly first-row seats to
the new first row for a mere $120,000.
39
Club seats are mushrooming at other stadiums, too. When the
Green Bay Packers renovated Lambeau Field in 2003, they added
1080 indoor club seats and 3200 outdoor club seats.' The Chicago
Bears added 8657 club seats when they recently renovated Soldier
Field. 41 The Philadelphia Eagles added 10,828 club seats when they
left Veterans Stadium for Lincoln Financial Field.
The most "premium" of the premium seating is a luxury box.
Fans-or, more usually, corporations-who purchase luxury boxes
can watch the game from what is essentially a hotel room, com-
plete with a wet bar, television, private bathroom, and food and
beverage service. Luxury suites usually cost between $50,000 and
34. Martin J. Greenberg, Sports Facility Financing and Development Trends in the United
States, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 93, 167 (2004).
35. Eugene J. Stroz, Jr., Note, Public Ownership of Sports Franchises: Investment, Novelty, or
Fraud?, 53 RUTGERS L. RaV. 517, 519 (2001).
36. Bill Shaikin, Stadium Revamp Is Fair Game, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at D1.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Bill Plaschke, Put in His Place, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at D1.
40. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 108.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 109. Lincoln Financial Field, like Veterans Stadium before it, has even more
"secluded" seating: ajail for unruly fans. Jamison Hensley, Eagles Fans Can Boo with Best, Says
Billick, BALT. SUN, Oct. 29, 2004, at 4D.
43. MatthewJ. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are They Economically Justifiable?
A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, U. MIAMI. Bus. L. REv. 483, 504 (2002).
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$200,000 per season, with the average price exceeding $100,000.4
Luxury suites at the Staples Center, home of the Los Angeles
Lakers, Clippers, and Kings, range from $197,000 to more than
41$300,000 per season.
Additionally, regular seats are increasingly sold only through
season tickets.46 And those teams that still offer single-game tickets
47
usually reserve the better seats for season ticket holders. A new
twist on the season ticket is the Personal Seat License (PSL). A PSL
essentially gives its holder nothing more than the right to spend
more money on a season ticket.' The Dallas Cowboys issued the
first PSLs in 1968, charging $300 to $1000 for a 40-year "seat op-
tion."49 Since then, many teams have required season ticket holders
to purchase PSLs. The Carolina Panthers raised $150 million in
1993 by selling nearly 63,000 PSLs at costs of $600 to $5400.50 One
commentator has observed that "PSLs amount to nothing more
than 'money raised from thin air' for the owners."5'
Notably, fans who can afford season tickets or PSLs receive little
in return other than entrance to the stadium. Fans generally have
no property interest in their season tickets or PSLs. Season ticket
holders have sued teams for preventing them from transferring their
season tickets, unilaterally moving their seat locations, and fraudu-
lently inducing their season ticket purchases with implied promises
of fielding competitive teams or staying in the community. 3 The
44. Id.; see also Robinson, supra note 33, at 144 n.34.
45. Parlow, supra note 43, at 539.
46. MICHAEL DANIELSON, HOME TEAM 65 (1997).
47. See, e.g., Doug Moore, New Park's Best Seats Will Hit Wallets, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 1291017 (Westlaw) ("The sweetest
seats in the new [St. Louis Cardinals' stadium]--designed to get you as close to the action as
possible-will likely go to current season ticket holders at Busch Stadium.... If all the seats
are not reserved by season ticket holders, other fans will get a shot at them.").
48. Mark Levengood, Unregistered Securities in the National Football League: Can the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 Protect Season Ticket Holders and Personal Seat License Holders ? 11 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 411, 415 (2004) ("While the specific rights vary from franchise to franchise, most
personal seat licenses include the right to renew a season ticket package on an annual basis,
the right of first refusal for playoff tickets, and the right to transfer the personal seat li-
cense.").
49. Parlow, supra note 43, at 503.
50. Id.
51. Stroz, supra note 35, at 519.
52. James T. Reese et al., National Football League Ticket Transfer Policies: Legal and Policy
Issues, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 163, 176-79 (2004). Only two bankruptcy courts have
considered season tickets to constitute a property interest. Id. at 179-80 (citing In re
Grossman v. Boston Red Sox, 292 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003); In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138
B.R. 490 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992)).
53. Id. at 163 (recounting unsuccessful actions by season ticket holders against NFL
teams for relocating seats); see also Levengood, supra note 48, at 417-18 (recounting unsuc-
cessful actions based on implied contract not to relocate or misrepresented quality of team);
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courts have largely turned a deaf ear to these season ticket holders'
claims.54
II. THE HURDLES TO A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TICKET PRICES
Despite the soaring cost of professional sports tickets, relatively
little legal commentary tackles the problem directly. Some say the
increase in professional sports ticket prices simply reflects eco-
nomic reality: owners are only charging what the market for
sporting tickets will bear. In addition, they have to increase revenue
to cover their players' increasing salaries. But closer analysis reveals
these two economic phenomena-the free market for tickets and
players' salaries-pose no hurdle to a legal analysis of professional
sports ticket prices.
Part II.A shows that the market for professional sports tickets is
not "free," as team owners reap billions of dollars from publicly-
funded corporate welfare and preferential legal treatment. Part
II.B demonstrates that the market for ticket prices is economically
distinct from the market for players' salaries. Clearing these two
hurdles will pave the way for a review of potential legal responses
to professional sports ticket prices.
A. The First Hurdle: The Myth of the Free Market
The first obstacle to analyzing professional sports ticket prices
from a legal perspective is the "myth of the free market." In a free
market, the thought goes, team owners should be allowed to
charge whatever ticket prices the market will bear. We can draw an
analogy to another business. If Starbucks can charge its customers
$4 for a venti caramel macchiato, then more power to it, many
would say. Few legal scholars would see the need for legislation or
court action to protect Starbucks customers' "right" to an afford-
able cup of coffee.
Amy Wang, Consumer Advocacy in the Sports Industry: Recognizing and Enforcing the Legal Rights of
Sports Fans, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 809, 813-17 (1999).
54. Reese et al., supra note 52, at 184-85 ("Previous non-bankruptcy cases have estab-
lished that the 'ownership' of tickets resides with professional teams. The courts have ruled
that professional teams are entitled to create and modify policies to manage season ticket
accounts.").
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Thoughts on the subject might change if we learned the law
bent over backwards to favor Starbucks at its customers' expense.
Imagine if Starbucks built its stores with public funds and tax-
exempt municipal bonds, had a coffee monopoly protected by un-
reasoned precedent and special interest legislation, and saved
hundreds of million of dollars through tax loopholes. People
might begin to wonder why legislatures would use the public cof-
fers to artificially prop up Starbucks, and why courts would protect
Starbucks's soaring prices from competition or regulation.
Professional sports team owners receive exactly this type of pref-
erential legal treatment. Because the courts and legislatures have
granted team owners a windfall of public funds and foregone tax
revenue, team owners are raising ticket prices in a market that is
far from "free."
1. The Corporate Welfare of Stadium Deals-Professional sports
teams are on the dole. The most blatant example of preferential
legal treatment for professional sports is the corporate welfare it
receives through public stadium construction and renovation.
Indeed, "taxpayers have been predominantly responsible for fi-
nancing the building of sports facilities to accommodate
professional franchises." 6 Between 1975 and 1990, state and local
governments spent $1.2 billion to build or renovate stadiums for
professional sports teams.57 During the 1990s, they spent more than
$12 billion on professional sports stadium construction, renova-
tion, or lease renegotiation.
Local governments routinely give away billion-dollar stadium
deals to professional sports teams. When the Chicago Bears asked
their fans to rebuild Soldier Field in 2000, the Illinois legislature
55. Michael D. Erickson, Upon Further Review ... When It Comes to Tax-Exempt Stadium
Finance Reform, Stop Cheering for the Popular Proposals and Adopt Simple Reform, 21 VA. TAX REv.
603, 605 (2002) (noting that critics of public stadium financing "argue that these facilities
merely manifest corporate welfare-payments from the strapped local government to wealthy
owners"); see also Robert Bacon, Initial Public Offerings and Professional Sports Teams: The Regu-
lations Work, but Are Owners and Investors Listening?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 139, 143
(2000) ("Historically, cities and states have subsidized wealthy owners' stadium construction
projects by burdening taxpayers.").
56. Bacon, supra note 55, at 143.
57. Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations from
Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and
the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REv. 57, 64 (1997).
58. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 121 (citing JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY
DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 136 (1999)); cf. Cheffins, supra note 1,
at 650 (citing Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship Between Major League
Sports and Government, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Apr. 1999, at 1, 11-15) (noting that government
subsidies accounted for nearly $15 billion of the $20 billion spend on such facilities in the
twentieth century).
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needed only three days to approve a $432 million contribution.59
Chicago-area taxpayers will be paying off the debt for more than
thirty years, at a total cost of $1.3 billion. 60 The State of Missouri,
the County of St. Louis, and the City of St. Louis spent $258 mil-
lion to build the TWA Dome (now the Edward Jones Dome) in
1995.61 By the time the three governments pay off the tax-exempt
bonds they issued to raise those funds, the stadium will have cost
Missouri taxpayers roughly $720 million.62 The people of Ontario,
Canada thought they were going to contribute $60 million of the
estimated $225 million needed to build the Toronto Blue Jay's Sky
Dome.63 But after extensive revisions to what ultimately became a
$628 million stadium complex, Ontario ended up paying an esti-
mated $278 million-more than the entire initial estimated cost.6
Overall, "[t]he public generally pays approximately 80% of the
cost for a new baseball facility and approximately 70% of the cost
for a new football facility."65 These percentages were highest in the
early 1990s, when the public paid 100% of the cost to buildJacobs
Field for the Cleveland Indians, 93.6% of the cost to build Oriole
Park at Camden Yards for the Baltimore Orioles, and 84.3% of the
cost to build the Ballpark at Arlington for the Texas Rangers.66 Al-
though these percentages have decreased somewhat, the total
dollar amount of the public contribution is increasing. Local gov-
ernment contributed approximately $418 million to build Safeco
Field for the Seattle Mariners in 1999, $328 million to build Miller
Park for the Milwaukee Brewers in 2001, and $300 million to build
Petco Park for the San Diego Padres in 2004.7 More recently, the
City of Newark agreed to contribute $210 million towards construc-
tion of a new arena for the NHL's NewJersey Devils.'
59. Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports'Bargaining Power Vis-a-Vis the American
City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 280, 281 (2003).
60. Id.
61. Parlow, supra note 43, at 518; see also Greenberg, supra note 34, at 121 (noting that
St. Louis reimbursed the Rams for lost revenue in Southern California, paid off $28 million
in debt owed to the Rams' Anaheim, California stadium, paid a $29 million relocation fee to
the NFL, and built a $12.5 million practice complex for the team).
62. Parlow, supra note 43, at 518. Before the Los Angeles Rams agreed to move to St.
Louis from Anaheim in 1996, the three governments committed to build the stadium before
securing a tenant. Id.
63. Todd Senkiewicz, Comment, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8
SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 575, 598 (1998).
64. Id. at 599.
65. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 123.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Ronald Smothers, Newark and Devils Sign Lease and Agree to Build an Arena, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at B7.
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Publicly-funded stadiums are also often built on publicly-
donated land. For example, Dodger Stadium is usually regarded as
a privately-funded stadium.69 But to lure the Dodgers from Brook-
lyn in 1958, the City of Los Angeles gave the Dodgers 300 acres
near the heart of downtown L.A.v° ProPlayer Stadium in Miami is
built on 160 acres donated by Dade County.7' The City of Charlotte
and the State of North Carolina spent $57 million to acquire land
for the Carolina Panther's Ericsson Stadium.72 In addition, whether
the stadium property is donated or not, professional sports teams
typically pay no property taxes on it.
7 s
If new stadium construction is not feasible, even on free land,
cities instead may offer to renovate the team's existing stadium. In
an effort to keep the Cleveland Browns from moving to Baltimore,
Cleveland offered to spend $175 million to renovate Cleveland
Stadium.74 At least Cleveland got to keep their money when the
Browns moved to Baltimore to play rent-free in their newly-
constructed, publicly-financed stadium. The situation was much
worse for Harris County, Texas, whose taxpayers had to pay off the
$50 million used to renovate the Astrodome for the Houston Oil-
ers long after the Oilers left Houston and became the Tennessee
Titans.75 And publicly-funded renovations are not limited to the
stadium itself. State and local governments spent $72 million on
infrastructure improvements around the Milwaukee Brewers's
Miller Park,76 and the State of Maryland spent $70 million improv-
ing the roads around the Washington Redskins's Jack Kent Cooke
Stadium.77 More recently, the State of New Jersey agreed to pay an
69. Zachary A. Phelps, Note, Stadium Construction for Professional Sports: Reversing the In-
equities Through Tax Incentives, 18 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 981, 1017 n.183 (2004); see
also Howard Fine, Absence of Leadership May Hinder NFL Deal L.A. Bus. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at 1,
available at 2005 WLNR 6886406 (Westlaw) ("Dodger Stadium was one of the first ballparks
to be built with private funds.").
70. See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 333 P.2d 745, 748-49 (1959); see also Fine,
supra note 69 (noting that the City of Los Angeles donated land for Dodger Stadium);
Walter O'Malley official website, Building O'Malley's Dream Stadium: Exchange of
Land, http://www.walteromalley.com/stad hist-page2.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2005) ("Los
Angeles agreed in September to exchange 300 acres of land in Chavez Ravine to the
Dodgers in return for the Dodgers' commitment to build a 50,000-seat stadium.").
71. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 250.
72. Id.
73. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 113, 130-31.
74. MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS 242 (1997).
75. Mitten & Burton, supra note 57, at 61, 76-77.
76. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 133.
77. Karl Vick & Thomas Heath, From Cooke's Unwavering Quest, a Dream Is Born, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at G4.
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estimated $30 million in infrastructure improvements for the New
York Giants's new stadium in East Rutherford 8
Once a city builds or renovates a stadium acceptable to its pro-
fessional sports team, it often leases it to the team at sweetheart
rates. "In fact, most teams pay rent that is far below the fair market
value., 79 Cities that charge below-market rents at least recoup some
of their investment; others cities charge no rent at all. The Balti-
more Ravens play rent-free in their 100% publicly-financed
stadium.80 The Minnesota Twins play rent-free in the Hubert H.
Humphrey Metrodome.1 New York actually had to pay the Yankees
$10,000 to play in Yankee Stadium in 1977 because the stadium
lease allowed the Yankees to deduct maintenance costs from their
rent.
82
As a final, brazen example of corporate welfare, the public occa-
sionally just gives money to professional sports teams. The
government coalition that lured the Rams to St. Louis gave them
$15 million to cover relocation expenses and assumed the Rams's
$30 million debt to the City of Anaheim. 3 The City of Montreal
and the Province of Quebec gave the new owners of the Montreal
Expos $33 million to help them buy the team in 1990.84 Biting the
hand that fed them, the Expos recently left Montreal to play in
Washington, D.C.85
2. Tax-Exempt Stadium Bonds-The public grants an additional
subsidy to professional sports when it pays for stadium construction
with tax-exempt municipal bonds. This funding is a common,
costly practice.88 For example, the City of San Diego issued $206
million in tax-exempt bonds to build Petco Park for the San Diego
Padres in 2004,87 the City of San Antonio issued $146.5 million in
tax-exempt bonds to build the SBC Center for the San Antonio
78. Laura Mansnerus, New Jersey Reveals the Details of a New Stadium for the Giants, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at BI.
79. Peter Sepulveda, The Use of the Eminent Domain Power in the Relocation of Sports Stadi-
ums to Urban Areas: Is the Public Purpose Requirement Satisfied?, 11 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 137,
151 (2001).
80. Id. at 146.
81. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 130; see also Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Minn.
Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
82. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 138.
83. Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Community-Based Owmership of a National Football League Fran-
chise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of NFL Teams, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv.
589, 601 (1998).
84. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 138.
85. Jeff Barker, Drama Comes Full Circle for D.C. Fans; Joy Had Become Despair; Now, Signs of
Baseball Life Spring Up Again in Capita BALT. SUN, Dec. 22, 2004, at 1C.
86. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 130-31.
87. Id. at 134.
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Spurs,88 and Cleveland's Gateway Economic Development Corpora-
tion issued $117 million in tax-exempt bonds to build Jacobs Field
for the Cleveland Indians. Municipal bonds are attractive to inves-
tors because their interest payments are not subject to federal
income tax.9° Because municipal bonds are tax-exempt, using them
to finance stadium construction spreads the costs of stadium con-
struction across all federal taxpayers. 9'
Before 1968, municipal bonds were exempt from federal income
tax regardless of their purpose.2 In 1968, Congress restricted
tax-exempt status to bonds benefiting the general public, and elimi-
nated the tax exemption for "private activity bonds., 93 But municipal
bonds issued to finance stadium construction were expressly
exempted from the private activity exception.94
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 limited, but did not preclude, the
use of tax-exempt municipal bonds to finance stadium construc-
tion.9 First, stadium bonds were now potentially subject to the
private activity exception.96 Second, the Act modified the test for
determining what constituted a private activity bond.97 A municipal
bond was now a private activity bond if: (1) the proceeds of the
bond offering were "to be used for any private business use"; and
(2) more than 10% of the bond was secured by, or more than 10%
of the interest payments would be derived from, property used for
private business purposes (the private security test) . The private
security test thus required local governments issuing tax-exempt
stadium bonds to avoid receiving more then 10% of the bond's
cost from the stadium lease. 99 This has had the unfortunate side-
effect of forcing local governments to slash stadium rents.90
Congress has been unable to further discourage tax-exempt sta-
dium bonds. In 1996, Senator Mike Dewine of Ohio introduced
88. Edelman, supra note 59, at 282.
89. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 132.
90. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2000).
91. Senkiewicz, supra note 63, at 583 ("[T]he use of tax-exempt debt [to finance sta-
dium construction] has the indirect effect of placing the cost burden upon all federal
taxpayers across the country.").
92. Erickson, supra note 55, at 608.
93. Id. (discussing the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
364, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 251, 266).
94. Id.
95. See I.R.C. §§ 103, 141 (2000).
96. Erickson, supra note 55, at 608 (noting that stadiums were no longer denominated
"exempt facilities").
97. Id.
98. I.R.C. § 141(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)-(2) (2000).
99. Erickson, supra note 55, at 609.
100. Id. at 611. ("[T]he 1986 Act has really forced local governments to give rent free
deals to sports teams in order to avoid the 10% security-interest test's classification .... ).°
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the Team Relocation and Taxpayer Protection Act, which would
have eliminated the tax exemption for a team's stadium bonds if
the team were to relocate.' In 1997, Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan of New York introduced the Stop Tax-Exempt Arena
Debt Issuance Act (STADIA), which would have deemed any bond
using more than $5 million or 5% of its proceeds to build a profes-
sional sports stadium as a private activity bond, ineligible for tax-
exempt status. 10 2 Neither bill made much headway in Congress.
0 3
Senator Moynihan reintroduced STADIA in 2000 without better
results. 10 4 In 1999, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania intro-
duced the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act, which
would have obviated the need for tax-exempt stadium bonds by
requiring professional sports leagues to establish a trust fund to
build or renovate stadiums.10 5 This measure also failed.'0 6
3. Baseball's Antitrust Exemption-The existing preferential legal
treatment does more than merely facilitate using public funds to
build stadiums for professional sports teams; it embraces and pro-
tects the "league" structure by which professional sports teams do
business. Major League Baseball has a free pass from antitrust scru-
tiny, courtesy of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs.07 The Federal League began play as a professional
baseball league in 1913.'08 By that time, the National and American
Leagues had not seen a competing league in more than twenty
years,'09 leading one contemporary court to conclude major league
baseball was "as complete a monopoly of the baseball business for
profit as any monopoly can be made.""0 The major leagues re-
sponded to this threat to their monopoly status by blacklisting
101. Id. at 629.
102. Id. at 613-14.
103. Id. at 613-14, 629.
104. Id. at 613; see also Edelman, supra note 59, at 305.
105. Erickson, supra note 55, at 6 24-25.
106. Edelman, supra note 59, at 305.
107. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922).
108. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 8.
109. Id. at 6 (noting the demise of the Players' League in 1890 and of the American As-
sociation in 1891). Another rival league, the Continental League, was proposed in 1959 by
former Brooklyn Dodgers general manager Branch Rickey and attorney William Shea. See
Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 625,
631 n.26 (noting that MLB expansion "forestalled entry" of the Continental League into the
professional baseball market). MLB defeated the Continental League before it played a
game by expanding into its proposed markets. Id.
110. Am. League Baseball Club of Chi. v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
[VOL. 39:1
Take Us Back to the Ball Game
players who defected to the Federal League."' The Federal League
sued the major leagues for restricting their access to players."2 As
Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis pondered his decision,"1 the two
leagues settled, and the major leagues paid the Federal League ap-
proximately $600,000."' One Federal League team, the Baltimore
Terrapins, was unsatisfied, and sued the National League."5 The
trial court awarded $240,000 to the Terrapins, which the D.C.
Court of Appeals reversed on appeal. 16
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, with its now-
astonishing holding that major league baseball does not affect in-
terstate commerce."7 Writing for the unanimous court, Justice
Holmes" 8 recognized the obvious fact that professional baseball
was a business, but argued "personal effort, not related to produc-
tion, is not a subject of commerce.""19 Moreover, "the business [in
question] is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are purely
state affairs." °20 That teams crossed state lines to play the game was
"a mere incident" to the essentially local activity of playing base-
ball. 2' Because professional baseball was not involved in interstate
commerce, it was immune from antitrust scrutiny under the
Sherman Act.
2
The Supreme Court has since conceded Justice Holmes got it
wrong: baseball was and is engaged in interstate commerce. 23 The
Court now acknowledges that its decisions giving MLB an antitrust
111. See Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 207.
112. Id.
113. Judge Landis made statements favoring the major leagues before taking the case
under advisement. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 9. These statements made a favorable
impression on the major league owners, who named Landis the first Commissioner of Base-
ball in 1920. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAw 9-10 (5th ed.
1998).
114. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at9.
115. Seeid.at9-10.
116. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Bait., Inc., 269 F. 681,
682 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
117. Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
118. Oliver Wendell Holmes played organized amateur baseball as a young man. ZIM-
BALIST, supra note 31, at 10. Another member of the court, Chief Justice William Howard
Taft, played third base for Yale and was the first President to throw out the first pitch of the
baseball season. Id.
119. Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 209.
120. Id. at 208.
121. Id. at 209.
122. Id. at 208-09; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000) (prohibiting "restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States").
123. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) ("Professional baseball is a business
and it is engaged in interstate commerce."); see also Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452
(1957) ("[Wlere we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate
we would have no doubts [that baseball is engaged in interstate commerce].").
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exemption may have been "unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical,"1 2 4
and recognizes the antitrust exemption is "an exception and an
anomaly," as well as "an aberration."25 Yet the Court has protected
MLB's antitrust exemption on two grounds: stare decisis and a lin-
gering conviction that Congress's failure to remedy the antitrust
exemption implies congressional approval. 126 The New York Times
ridiculed this rationale: "The only basis for the judge-made mo-
nopoly status of baseball is that the Supreme Court made a mistake
the first time it considered the subject... and now feels obliged to
keep on making the same mistake because Congress does not act
to repeal the exemption it never ordered." 0 7 In fact, Congress held
hearings in 1951 to examine the antitrust exemption. It took no
action because it believed the Second Circuit's decision in Gardella
v. Chandler,12 holding that MLB's use of radio and television impli-
cated interstate commerce, supplanted the antitrust exemption.13°
But Congress was mistaken, as the 1953 Toolson decision made clear
that the antitrust exemption survived Gardella. '3 In the twenty years
between Toolson and the Court's 1972 Flood decision, more than
fifty bills were introduced to limit the antitrust exemption. 32 None
made it out of committee. '3 3 More recent efforts to end baseball's
antitrust exemption have also failed.'34
The main reason for Congress's failure to repeal the antitrust
exemption is MLB's powerful lobby. Even during the 1951 hear-
ings, major league baseball overwhelmed Congress with its
lobbying effort. The committee chairman remarked he had never
seen such organized, determined lobbyists: "They came upon
124. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452.
125. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
126. Id. at 282-83; see also Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953)
("[Baseball] has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was
not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present cases ask us to overrule the [Federal
Baseball Club] decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the [Sherman Act] legislation
applicable. We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of
the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.").
127. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 19 (quoting Editorial, Judge-Made Monopoly, N.Y.
TiME,June 23, 1972, at 36).
128. Id. at 14.
129. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
130. Id. at 407-08.
131. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
132. John C. Dodge, Regulating the Baseball Monopoly: One Suggestion for Governing the
Game, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 35, 52 (1995) (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281
(1972)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 53-54.
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Washington like locusts. 13 5 Thus, the antitrust exemption today
survives between the turned backs of the Supreme Court and Con-
gress, as each refuses to clean up the mess it believes the other
made. No reason in logic or law exists to explain why MLB is "the
only industry in the United States that has a blanket exemption
from the country's antitrust laws and is subject to no trade regula-
tion."' MLB's antitrust exemption ensures it can wield monopoly
power that, as the next two parts of this Article show, allows profes-
sional sports leagues to suppress competition and extract
concessions from the fans and the general public.
4. Monopoly Leagues-Although the NBA, NHL, and NFL are
technically subject to antitrust scrutiny, 37 each league nonetheless
enjoys a monopoly in its sport. Historically, only one major profes-
sional sports league has existed in each sport at any given time.'
3
When rival leagues emerge, they are short-lived; the dominant ma-
jor league absorbs them, marginalizes them, or drives them out of
business.'"
The NBA, formed in 1949, has faced two rivals to its monopoly
status. 140 The American Basketball League challenged the NBA for
one season, 1961-1962, before folding.14' The American Basketball
Association (ABA) posed a more serious threat to the NBA's mo-
nopoly in 1967.142 Interestingly, the ABA was not intended to
compete with the NBA, but to force the NBA to absorb it.143 After
135. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 14 (quoting Representative Emmanuel Celler of New
York deliberating on a sports exemption bill in 1958).
136. Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON HALLJ. SPORT
L. 287, 288 (1994).
137. See, e.g., Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957) (declining to extend MLB
antitrust exemption to the NFL); Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600-01
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the NBA is subject to Rule of Reason analysis under the
Sherman Act); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (9th Cir.
1984) (rejecting the NFL's claim that it is a "single entity" immune from antitrust scrutiny
and citing cases holding that NFL player contract rules violated Sherman Act); S.F. Seals,
Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F Supp. 966, 968 (C.D. Cal. 1974) ("Plaintiff contends at the outset that
major league professional hockey is subject to federal anti-trust laws. It seem [sic] to me
reasonably clear that this is so and I so hold.").
138. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 595.
139. Mitten & Burton, supra note 57, at 93 ("It is extremely difficult for more than one
major professional league to exist in the same sport for a prolonged period."); see also
DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 210 ("[N]ew leagues either fail or are absorbed by existing
leagues....").
140. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 202. The NBA itself resulted from the anticompetitive
merger of the upstart Basketball Association of America and the National Basketball League.
Id. at 202, 211.
141. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 595
142. Id.
143. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 210.
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nine seasons, the NBA acceded, accepting four of the six remain-
ing ABA teams.'
The NHL, formed in 1917, also has faced two challenges to its
monopoly status. 45 The NHL eliminated the rival Western Canada
Hockey League in 1926, absorbing one WCHL team and distribut-
ing the other WCHL players to new NHL franchises in New York
and Chicago. 6 The NHL then enjoyed an unrivaled existence un-
til 1972, when the World Hockey Association (WHA) began play.
4 7
The NHL drove the WHA out of business in 1979, absorbing four
of its remaining teams.'4
The NFL has faced more serious challenges, but maintains its
monopoly. 49 Since its formation in 1920, at least eight rival leagues
have come and gone, all dispatched by the NFL's monopoly
power.5t The first serious rival, the All-American Football Confer-
ence, played from 1946 to 1949, when the NFL absorbed its San
Francisco, Baltimore, and Cleveland franchises.' 5' The most serious
NFL rival, the American Football League (AFL), played for six sea-
sons starting in 1960.152 It competed with relative success against the
NFL, due largely to its network television contracts with ABC and
NBC. 5 3 Its success led the NFL to seek a merger.154 To obtain con-
gressional blessing, the NFL promised to expand into Louisiana-
the home state of the House and Senate committee chairmen
144. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 202, 211; WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at595.
145. ROSENTRAUB, supra note 74, at 89.
146. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 202, 211. The NHL allowed the Victoria Cougars to
join the league in exchange for moving to Detroit, where it became the Detroit Red Wings.
Id. at 202.
147. Id. at 203.
148. Id. at 211; see also WEILER& ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 595.
149. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 595. In 1999, the NFL purchased an option
to buy up to 49.9% of the Arena Football League, which plays a modified version of NFL
football in indoor stadiums. Philip A. Dominique, Comment, To Protect a Monopoly: The Hid-
den Reasons Wy the National Football League Has Purchased an Option to Buy the Arena Football
League, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2000). The NFL allowed the option to expire in
March of 2002. Tom Silverstein, A Holding Pattern: Investment in Arena League Will Have to
Wait, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 21, 2002, at C8, available at 2002 WLNR 3580205 (West-
law). The NFL still keeps close tabs on the Arena Football League, as nine NFL team owners
have interests in Arena Football teams. Ross McKeon, An Arena of Success: Having Found Its
Niche, AFL Is a Flourishing League, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 2005, at DI. The Canadian Football
League plays in a different geographic market than the NFL, which has no teams in Canada.
Dominique, supra, at 1346.
150. ROSENTRAUB, supra note 74, at 88. The NFL has dispatched the All-American Foot-
ball Conference, the World Football League, the United States Football League, the XFL,
and four different leagues named the American Football League. Id.
151. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 595-96.
152. Id.
153. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 204.
154. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 602.
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responsible for approving the merger.55 The NFL's gift to Louisi-
ana resulted in an amendment to the Sports Broadcasting Act
exempting the NFL-AFL merger from antitrust scrutiny. 15 All nine
AFL teams joined the NFL, ending the threat to the NFL's monop-
oly.
157
Since the AFL-NFL merger, two other serious rival leagues have
come and gone.15 ' The World Football League (WFL) lasted only
two seasons, from 1972 to 1974.159 The United States Football
League (USFL) fared no better, lasting from 1983 to 1985.1' No
WFL or USFL teams survived. Rather, "[t]he NFL's superior prod-
uct, resources, and markets produced unconditional triumphs over
the WFL and USFL." 6'
Rival leagues have challenged the professional sports monopo-
lies in court, but "[j]udges ... have not been very receptive to the
[antitrust] claims of new leagues."162 The AFL could not convince
the Fourth Circuit that the NFL had market power,63 and the
WFL's Mid-South Grizzlies could not prove the NFL illegally main-
tained its monopoly power, or injured competition by refusing to
add the team.1 64 The only two successful antitrust suits by rival
leagues proved to be victories in vain. The WHA successfully sued
the NHL over its player reserve clauses, which perpetually bound
NHL players to their teams.' 65 The court held that "It] he NHL [had]
willfully acquired and maintained its monopoly power" in the mar-
ket for players, and enjoined the NHL from enforcing the reserve
clauses, but the NHL still drove the WHA out of business a few sea-
sons later.16 The USFL successfully sued the NFL over the NFL's
monopolization of the U.S. professional football markets, but re-
ceived only $1 in damages, trebled to $3,167 or "barely enough to buy
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 596.
158. In 2001, the NFL dispatched the XFL, a creation of professional wrestling's Vince
McMahon that was only arguably "serious." Neil B. Cohen & Spencer Weber Waller, Taking
Pop-Ups Seriously: The Jurisprudence of the Infield Fly Rule, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 453, 474 (2004).
159. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 203.
160. U.S. Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1340 (2d Cir. 1988).
161. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 210.
162. Id. at 209-10.
163. Am. Football League v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1963).
164. Mid-S. Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 786-88 (3d Cir. 1983).
165. Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 462, 467,
480 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
166. Id. at 510; see also DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 210.
167. U.S. Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1988); see also WEILER
& ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 630.
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a soft drink at an NFL game."' 6 The USFL's court victory "proved
to be a mocking footnote to the history of a defunct league."' 69
The legal system's unparalleled deference to the professional
sports monopolies allows them to "operate similarly to illegal car-
tels, adopting and enforcing rules designed to maximize profits for
member teams and limit entry of outsiders."'7 Professional sports
leagues wield their monopoly power in the markets for players,
stadiums, and broadcast rights, suppressing rival leagues and ex-
tracting legal and financial concessions from the public. 7 '
5. The Sports Broadcasting Act--Congress expressly granted pro-
fessional sports teams additional monopoly power through a piece
of special-interest legislation, the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA) .12
Before the SBA, the Department of Justice twice questioned league
negotiations with broadcast networks. In 1953, the Justice Depart-
ment sued the NFL over its blackout policy, which prohibited
teams from broadcasting their games into other teams' regions,
claiming this constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade 3 The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania partially upheld the NFL's black-
out policy, holding that it reasonably protected other teams'
stadium attendance when they were playing at home. 4 In 1960,
the Justice Department sued the NFL over its league-wide televi-
sion contract with CBS. 7 5 The same judge who partially upheld the
NFL's blackout policy invalidated the NFL-CBS contract, holding
that it unreasonably restrained the ability of individual teams to
negotiate their own television contracts.
71
The NFL, alarmed by these decisions and the 1957 Radovich de-
cision declining to extend MLB's antitrust exemption, responded
with "an end run around the courts in Congress.' '177 The NFL suc-
cessfully lobbied Congress to pass the SBA, which granted the NFL,
NBA, NHL, and MLB limited antitrust exemptions to negotiate
league-wide television contracts. 78 Professional sports have greatly
168. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 210.
169. Id.
170. Edelman, supra note 59, at 291.
171. Id. at 289-92; see also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 608-09, 620, 629
(player market, stadium market, and television contract market, respectively).
172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2000).
173. United States v. NFL, 116 F Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Specifically, Article X of the
NFL by-laws prohibited broadcasting games into a seventy-five-mile area surrounding the
home of other teams, with certain caveats. Id. at 321.
174. See id. at 326-27.
175. United States v. NFL, 196 F.Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
176. See id. at 446-47.
177. DANIELSON, supra note 46, at 98.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) ("The antitrust laws ... shall not apply to any joint agree-
ment by or among persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team
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profited from this special-interest legislation at the expense of the
public. The NFL's broadcast revenue jumped after Congress passed
the SBA."9 Economist Roger Noll determined that "within two
years of the SBA's passage, the NFL and MLB had their revenues
triple while the number of broadcast games was cut in half."'80 Pro-
fessional sports now use the SBA to negotiate multi-billion dollar
television contracts, not just with network television, but increas-
ingly with cable television stations and satellite television
providers. 18' The SBA essentially gives professional sports a billion-
dollar bargaining chip with cable and satellite broadcasters, and
"[a]s a result, many fans have found that following their favorite
,,182team on television has become too expensive ....
6. Depreciating Player Salaries-Besides allowing professional
sports teams to benefit from tax-exempt stadiums bonds, the tax
code gives professional sports teams a unique advantage: they are
the only businesses that can depreciate employee (i.e. player) sala-
ries.' When a new owner buys a professional sports team, he can
attribute 50% of the purchase price to player salaries and depreci-
ate that amount over five years. 4 For example, when John Henry
and his group of investors bought the Boston Red Sox in 2002 for
$700 million, they could attribute $350 million to player con-
tracts. 8 They were then entitled to a $70 million deduction for five
years, meaning that team profits up to that amount are earned tax-
free. If the profits fall short of that amount, the shortfall is a loss
that can offset the owners' profits from other sources. Either way,
they greatly reduce their overall tax liability. In addition, allocating
sports of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating
in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers
all or any part of the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of
the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey. ").
179. H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You're Out: An Investigation of Professional Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REv. 369, 372 (1988) ("[M]ost [professional sports] leagues
were able to double or triple their television revenues within a year of the (SBA's] pas-
sage.").
180. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 151 (citing Roger Noll, The Economics of Sports Leagues,
in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 17.8 (Gary Uberstine ed., 1988)).
181. The NFL will generate $8 billion from its current six-year contracts with CBS and
Fox, and $3.5 billion from its current five-year contract with DirecTV. Stephen A. Smith,
While Hockey Blows It, NL Mines More Gol" PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 5, 2005, at E01, available at
2005 WLNR 1608892 (Westlaw). National television contracts generate $567 million for the
NBA, $558 million for MLB, and $67 million for the NHL. Id.
182. Glazer, supra note 19, at 403.
183. Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market Teams in Major League
Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 323, 352 (1994) (noting "the unique tax treatment given to the
depreciation of player salaries" (citing ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 34-36 (1992))).
184. Id. at 352; see also I.R.C. § 167(a) (2000).
185. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 114 (listing the Red Sox purchase price).
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50% of the purchase price to player contracts benefits the owners
when they eventually sell the Red Sox, as it increases the amount of
sales proceeds that will be classified as capital gains, which are
taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income:1
86
This uniquely favorable tax status deprives the federal taxpayers
of hundreds of millions of dollars. In the Red Sox scenario, the $70
million annual deduction saves the owners approximately $24.5
million in taxes each year. Thus, over the five-year course of the
deduction, the public will contribute roughly $122.5 million in
foregone tax revenue to John Henry and his group.17 Before the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, the situation was even worse for the pub-
lic, as team owners could attribute much more than 50% of the
teams' purchase price to player contracts."' When Bud Selig
bought the Seattle Pilots in 1969, the Seventh Circuit permitted
him to allocate $10.2 million of the $10.8 million purchase price-
almost 95%-to player contracts.
189
Allowing professional sports teams to depreciate player salaries
gives them an unjustified tax shelter. First, it is a fiction to pretend
fully half of a team's value comes from its player contracts. Rather,
the vast majority of a team's value comes from sharing in the mo-
nopoly power of a professional league, participating in revenue
sharing, and restocking rosters through free agency and drafts.' 90
Second, it is far from certain that all players depreciate in value over
time. It is certainly not the general rule that employees increasingly
lose value the longer they work for their employers. Professional ath-
letes are no exception. If anything, players may appreciate in value
186. Mitten & Burton, supra note 57, at 130 (stating that allocating team value to player
contracts "facilitates characterizing appreciation in franchise value as a capital gain and
enables the team owner to take advantage of favorable tax treatment").
187. Martens, supra note 183, at 352-53 (stating that depreciating player salaries "forces
the government to subsidize the purchase of the franchise by an amount equal to the pre-
sent value of the amount allocated to players' contracts multiplied by the corporate tax rate"
(citingJennifer Reingold, When Less Is More, FIN. WORLD, May 23, 1993, at 8)).
188. See Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 579 n.17 (7th Cir. 1982) (allowing Bud
Selig to attribute 95% of the 1969 purchase price of the Seattle Pilots to player contracts).
Selig moved the Pilots away from Seattle to his hometown of Milwaukee and renamed the
team the Milwaukee Brewers. Id. at 574-75.
189. Id. at 575.
190. Martens, supra note 183, at 353 (stating that team value is primarily derived from
"the monopoly rent that is generated by belonging to Major League Baseball and the exclu-
sive territorial rights membership confers, not to the players' contracts" (quoting ZIMBALIST,
supra note 31, at 35-36)); see also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 548 (noting that
team value is derived from "the right to participate in the rookie draft, the salary cap system,
and other features of the players market that allow teams to restock their rosters as current
players leave").
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during the five years their owner is depreciating their salaries as
they gain experience and learn the team's system.
191
B. The Second Hurdle: The Scapegoat of Player Salaries
Part II.A cleared the first hurdle to a legal analysis of profes-
sional sports ticket prices by showing that professional sports do
not play in a free market, but instead benefit from preferential laws
and policies. This part clears a second hurdle: the popular belief
that high player salaries cause high ticket prices.9
If conventional wisdom were correct, then we could lower ticket
prices by decreasing player salaries or increasing non-ticket reve-
nues. But this has not been the case. For example, both the NBA
and the NFL instituted salary caps in the 1980s, but neither subse-
quently lowered ticket prices.'93 MLB owners illegally colluded to
slash free agent salaries from 1985 to 1987, but did not pass on their
savings to fans by suddenly dropping ticket prices at the same time.94
191. Martens, supra, note 183, at 353 (quoting ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 35-36).
192. Glazer, supra note 19, at 402.
193. See Ken Rosenthal, Four More Years: Baseball Has a Labor Agreement, but the Balance of
Power Still Hinges on the Balance in George Steinbrenner's Checkbook, SPORTING NEWS, Sept. 2,
2002, at 24, available at 2002 WLNR 7269811 (Westlaw) (dispelling the myth that "if salaries
stop rising, so will ticket prices") ("The NBA implemented a salary cap for the 1984-85 sea-
son, yet its average ticket price more than doubled from $22.52 to $50.10 over the 10-year
period starting in 1991-92, according to Team Marketing Report. The NFL implemented a
cap in 1994, and since then its average ticket price has risen from $30.83 to $53.65-a 74
percent jump ... ."); see also Bob Wojonowski, Lockout Could Be End of Yzerman's Career, DE-
TROIT NEWS, Dec. 7, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 13699551 (Wesdaw) ("I think the
biggest misconception is the supposed reasons we need a salary cap. Look at the leagues--
NFL and NBA-that have one. It hasn't ensured competitive balance, it hasn't prevented
teams from moving and it hasn't kept ticket prices down." (quoting NHL great Steve Yzer-
man)). The NHL and its players association agreed to implement a salary cap for the 2005
season; fans and commentators already are complaining that NHL teams have not lowered
ticket prices accordingly. See Rich Chere, Not All Devils Fans Love Newark, STAR-LEDGER (New-
ark, N.J.), Sept. 24, 2005, at Sports 28, available at 2005 WLNR 15077180 (Westlaw); Mac
Engel, Stars Plan to Work Hard to Lure Fans Back, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 15, 2005,
at D3, available at 2005 WLNR 11106152 (Westlaw); J.P. Giglio, Canes Plot New Course, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),July 15, 2005, at C1, available at 2005 WLNR 11104996 (Westlaw);
Michael Rosenberg, Hockeytown: Where the Same Is Less and Less Is Really More, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Aug. 10, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15627430 (Westlaw).
194. Jacob F Lamme, The Twelve Year Rain Delay: Why a Change in Leadership Will Benefit
the Game of Baseball, 68 ALB. L. REV. 155, 172-74 (2004). In 1985, then-commissioner Peter
Ueberroth encouraged teams to limit free agent signings, but warned that an "orchestrated
effort" to do so would violate MLB's collective bargaining agreement with the players. Id. at
172. The team owners proceeded to enter into just such an orchestrated effort, as the play-
ers proved in three separate arbitrations between 1987 and 1990. Id. at 172-74. MLB settled
with the players for $280 million, which was funded by adding four new teams and charging
60 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Moreover, teams' owners in all major leagues have dramatically in-
creased revenue from stadium naming rights and other non-ticket
sources, without lowering ticket prices.
95
Thus, the conventional wisdom is simply wrong. It is a "myth
that the escalation in ticket prices is caused by high salaries."' 96 As
another commentator puts it, "[h]igh salaries do not cause high
ticket prices .... [I]f payroll were to increase by 50 percent tomor-
row, owners would not be able to make up the revenue by raising
ticket prices-if they could raise ticket prices without losing reve-
nue, they already would have done so."' 9' Indeed, even though
MLB player salaries skyrocketed after the onset of free agency in
the mid-1970s, ticket prices did not jump.'9 And lowered salaries
will not lead to lowered ticket prices. In fact, "[i]f payroll were cut
in half tomorrow, it is not clear why an owner would cut ticket
prices . . . ." 99 High salaries effect ticket prices only in two indirect
ways-a team with high-priced star players may generate more
ticket demand than a bargain-priced team, and a high payroll may
encourage owners to better market their teams.00 Thus, high
player salaries may allow an owner to charge higher prices, but they
do not require the owner to do so.
Simply put, team owners will always charge as much as possible
for tickets, regardless of what they pay for player salaries. Fans can-
not allow their justified antipathy for millionaire players to excuse
ticket price gouging by billionaire owners.
the new owners $490 million in expansion fees. Id. at 174, 177; see also Glazer, supra note 19,
at 401.
195. Parlow, supra note 43, at 539 (noting that the developer of Los Angeles' Staples
Center receives $116 million over twenty years in naming rights, $20 to $30 million per year
in stadium advertising, and $9.6 million per year in parking revenue); Robert H. Thorn-
burg, Stadium Naming Rights: An Assessment of the Contract and Trademark Issues Inherent to both
Professional and Collegiate Stadiums, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 328, 332-35 (2003) (reviewing
recent naming rights deals). See generally supra Part IA
196. Stephen F Ross, Light, Less-Filling It's Blue Ribbon!, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1675, 1689
(2002) (citing RICHARD C. LEVINE ET AL., THE REPORT OF INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSIONER'S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL ECONOMICS 1 (2000), available at http://
www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf).
197. Id at 1689-90.
198. Glazer, supra note 19, at 401-02.
199. Ross, supra note 196, at 1690.
200. Id
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III. POTENTIAL LEGAL RESPONSES
Part I showed how professional sports teams are pricing the
regular fan out of the stadium through ticket price hikes and pre-
mium seating. Part II cleared the two hurdles to looking for a legal
response to soaring professional sports ticket prices: the myth of
the free market and the scapegoat of player salaries. This part will
focus on four possible legal responses. The first two options con-
trol professional sports ticket prices at the federal level: federal
regulation of professional sports and elimination of preferential
legal treatment until professional sports teams set affordable ticket
prices. The second two options control professional sports ticket
prices at the local level: taking professional sports teams through
eminent domain and encouraging local ownership of professional
sports teams.
A. Regulate Professional Sports
The most direct way for the public to control professional sports
ticket prices is through federal regulation of professional sports. In
Nebbia v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "nei-
ther property rights nor contract rights are absolute .... Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest. " 2 Federal regulation of an industry is
constitutional if the regulations have "a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discrimi-
natory., 20 2 Industries amenable to public regulation generally share
two primary characteristics. First, they have a "special public impor-
tance," as professional sports seem to have.03 Second, they operate
in conditions that "lead almost inevitably to monopoly.""4
We must therefore inquire whether professional sports leagues
are natural monopolies. A natural monopoly exists when "the
market will only allow a single producer to be profitable."2 0 5 The
relatively infrequent appearance of ultimately-unsuccessful rival
leagues suggests this may be true.0 6 This is likely due to the
201. Nebbia v. NewYork, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 537.
203. Dodge, supra note 132, at 59-60.
204. Id. at 59.
205. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 607.
206. See supra Part II.A.4.
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psychology of competition, which leads fans to prefer one major
league that names that year's supreme champion in each sport.
27
Indeed, fans have long decried the absence of a clear-cut champi-
onship system in Division I-A college football. °8
If professional sports leagues are natural monopolies, then fed-
eral regulation is the historically appropriate treatment.209 A federal
regulatory commission could take many forms. One proposal for a
MLB commission called for a three-member panel, with the own-
ers, the players, and the public each selecting one commissioner.210
This proposal could be expanded to govern all four major profes-
sional sports, resulting in a twelve-member commission. Another
proposal called for the President to appoint a bipartisan commis-
sion to govern sports in the interests of players, owners, and fans.1
Although federal regulation of professional sports would cer-
tainly allow the public to lower ticket prices, it poses numerous
problems. First, either Congress or the courts would have to step
up to the plate and take a swing against Federal Baseball Although
Federal Baseball specifically held that MLB is immune from federal
antitrust scrutiny, its determination that MLB is not engaged in
interstate commerce would appear to place MLB beyond any fed-
eral regulation at all. But as noted above, neither Congress nor
the judiciary has shown much interest in correcting Federal Baseball
No sudden groundswell of support for federal regulation of profes-
sional sports seems likely, as many share the sentiment that
"[e]specially over the past half century, Washington has proven
worries of an overbearing, meddlesome federal government le-
gitimate. ' '213 Even President Clinton famously conceded, "The era
of big government is over.",11 Second, and more fundamentally, the
207. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 644.
208. Katherine McClelland, Should College Football's Currency Read "In BCS We Trust" or Is
It Just Monopoly Money?: Antitrust Implications of the Bowl Championship Series, 37 Tx. TECH L.
REv. 167, 202-05 (2004) (summarizing criticism of the Bowl Championship Series's [BCS]
failure to crown an undisputed number one college football team, and noting antitrust
implications of the BCS arrangement).
209. WEIIE & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 644.
210. Dodge, supra note 132, at 61-64.
211. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 183-84.
212. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 208-09 (1922); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005) ("[There are]
three general categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its
commerce power. First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
and persons or things in interstate commerce. Third, Congress has the power to regulate
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." (citations omitted)).
213. Erickson, supra note 55, at 637.
214. William J. Clinton, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address of the Presi-
dent (Jan. 23, 1996), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/01/1996-01-23-president-
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dangers of federal regulation may outweigh any beneficial effect
on ticket prices. Owners and players alike may fear that a federal
sports commission would become an undesired bureaucratic im-
pediment to competition or innovation. Fans may fear a federal
sports commission would ultimately become subservient to the
teams it purports to regulate."5
B. End Preferential Legal Treatment
Although it is unlikely that many would support imposing fed-
eral regulation on professional sports, more support may be
garnered to reduce the preferential legal treatment we give profes-
sional sports. Congress could begin weaning professional sports
from the windfall of public funds, antitrust exemptions, and tax
breaks discussed in Part II, until professional sports teams restrain
themselves from increasing gate revenue by any means necessary
and recommit themselves to serving the regular fan through af-
fordable ticket prices.
Although this approach has some intuitive appeal, it is unlikely to
succeed. Congress has demonstrated little desire to push profes-
sional sports teams away from the public's trough. Congress has
been unable or unwilling to end MLB's unjustified antitrust exemp-
tion.216 Instead, Congress fostered professional sports' monopoly
power by enacting the SBA, including the amendment allowing the
NFL-AFL merger. 7 And although three bills have been introduced
since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to limit tax-exempt stadium bonds,
none have passed.1 Any new legislation to lower professional sports
ticket prices would likely succumb to the professional sports
leagues' powerful lobby.'19
state-of-the-union-address-as-delivered.html ("We know big government does not have all the
answers. We know there's not a program for every problem. (Applause.) We know, and we
have worked to give the American people a smaller, less bureaucratic government in Wash-
ington. And we have to give the American people one that lives within its means.
(Applause.) The era of big government is over.").
215. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101
COLUM. L. REv 1479, 1505 (2001) ("[Ilndustry-specific agencies are most likely to be re-
sponsive to the concerns of the industry, labor union, and public interest groups ... that
confront them on a daily basis."); see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal
Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv. 469, 497-98 (1996) (noting that independent federal agencies are
subject to "industry-group domination").
216. See supra Part II.A.3.
217. See supra Part IIA4-5.
218. See supra Part II.A.2.
219. See supra Part II.A.3.
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Moreover, it is unclear how Congress would translate continued
preferential legal treatment into reduced professional sports ticket
prices. Would Congress eliminate its professional sports subsidies
until ticket prices were lowered to some specific price level? Con-
gress would then have to determine what constitutes "affordable"
tickets prices, taking into account the varying ticket prices among
the different professional sports, and the varying prices charged by
the individual teams in each sport. Even if Congress could decide
what constitutes affordable professional sports ticket prices, getting
ticket prices to that level poses a procedural nightmare. Should
professional sports teams lower ticket prices for all seats in the sta-
dium, even if ticket prices for more-desirable field level, 50-yard
line, or center ice seats are still out of the reach of the average fan?
Or should teams sell a certain percentage of stadium seats at rea-
sonable prices, even if the discounted tickets are for less-desirable
bleacher, end-zone, or "nose bleed" seats? Should Congress dis-
courage premium seating to create more stadium space for regular
fans, or encourage premium seating to underwrite lower prices on
regular seating? How would Congress prevent ticket brokers and
scalpers from acquiring the reasonably-priced tickets and reselling
them at higher prices? It could distribute the tickets by lottery, but
who would run it? Would the congressmen and senators distribute
the tickets themselves, the way they distribute tour tickets to popu-
lar Washington, D.C. landmarks?
These are difficult questions to answer with regard to any one
team, and they become much more difficult with regard to all 122
MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL teams across the United States and
Canada. Different constituencies would likely suggest different an-
swers, because sound ticket policies in New York and Los Angeles
may not be as sound in Kansas City or Green Bay. Bridging the in-
evitable political gap may prove daunting, to say the least. A
glimpse of the sort of political bickering that attempting to regu-
late professional sports ticket prices is likely to entail may be seen in
the failed negotiations to build a "West Side Stadium" in New York.
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg championed a plan to
build a stadium in Manhattan's Upper West Side for the New York
Jets and the 2012 Olympics (since awarded to London), but the
stadium plan crumbled after Bloomberg failed to obtain political
support from New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver.220
Thus, even if Congress could muster the political will to rein in
the preferential legal treatment it provides professional sports, no
220. Jennifer Steinhauer, Requiem for West Side Stadium: Overtures Were Made Too Late, N.Y.
TIMES,June 8, 2005, at Al.
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obvious mechanism exists to translate that restriction into reason-
able professional sports ticket prices.
C. Take Teams by Eminent Domain
Although a nationwide consensus to regulate professional sports
or end preferential legal treatment at the federal level is unlikely, a
sufficiently-vocal movement to lower professional sports ticket
prices could arise locally. A local government seeking to directly set
professional sports ticket prices could do so by taking ownership of
a professional sports team through eminent domain. The Takings
Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the federal and local
government to take property through eminent domain, subject to
two restrictions." ' First, the private property must be taken for a
legitimate public purpose.22 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
public purposes generally include "matters of public health, rec-
reation and enjoyment., 2 1 In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, the
California Supreme Court specifically held that the condemnation
224of a professional sports team can serve a legitimate public purpose.
Other courts have held that the condemnation of land to facilitate
22*stadium construction serves a legitimate public purpose. 25 Courts
have also observed the legitimate public interest in professional
sports in a variety of contexts besides condemnation proceedings.
26
Second, the government must pay 'just compensation" for the
property.27 just compensation is usually determined by fair market
221. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
222. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661-62 (2005).
223. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
224. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 843 (Cal. 1982) ("[W]e con-
clude only that the acquisition and, indeed, the operation of a sports franchise may be an
appropriate municipal function. If such valid public use can be demonstrated, the statutes
discussed herein afford City the power to acquire by eminent domain any property neces-
sary to accomplish that use.").
225. See, e.g., N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A2d 545, 552 (N.J. 1972)
(permitting condemnation to construct the Meadowlands, home to the New York Giants
and New York Jets); cf In re Opinion of Justices, 250 N.E. 2d 547, 558-59 (Mass. 1969) (re-
quiring stadiums to meet certain guidelines to qualify as public use). But see City of
Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., 11 Mass. L. Rptr. 379, Nos. 19991318, 991230, 000014, 2000
WL 782971, at *42-50 (Mass. Feb. 25, 2000) (setting aside taking of land condemned for
minor league stadium because taking primarily benefited team, not public). See generally
Sepulveda, supra note 79.
226. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 95-99 (citing cases holding that taxes levied to pay for
stadium construction serve a public purpose).
227. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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value.228 The fair market value of a professional sports team, as
noted above, would primarily include the value of the right to par-
ticipate in the league's monopoly power, as well as the stadium
lease and player contracts. 22 Economists regularly estimate the
230
market value of professional sports teams, and teams are rou-
231tinely sold to new owners. Municipalities and courts thus would
have little trouble deriving a fair market value for professional
sports teams.
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution places a third
restriction on the eminent domain power by forbidding local gov-
ernment from unduly burdening interstate commerce. 2 This
restriction is known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause.33 In City
of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders I), the California Supreme
234Court held that NFL teams are engaged in interstate commerce.
Even though such condemnation "would scarcely affect the flow of
interstate commerce," 35 the court stated that condemnation of a
professional football team by the City of Oakland would be "the
precise brand of parochial meddling with the national economy
that the commerce clause was designed to prohibit."23 6 The court
expressed concern that a municipal owner of a professional sports
team might contravene league policies in favor of the local public
interest.
237
Despite the availability of a mechanism for local governments to
take professional sports teams by eminent domain, they are
unlikely to do so. The professional sports team and its league
would strenuously lobby against condemnation. If the local gov-
ernment persisted, the ensuing litigation would be protracted and
expensive for the local government. And success is far from guar-
anteed-as Raiders II shows, the dormant commerce clause poses a
228. Rafael A. Declet, Jr., We'll Take the Yankees: Assessing the Feasibility of a State Condemna-
tion of Baseball's Greatest Franchise, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 53, 64 (1997) (citing Sparkhill Realty
Corp. v. State, 197 N.E. 192 (N.Y. 1935); In re Brookfield, 68 N.E. 138 (N.Y. 1903)).
229. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 34, at 115 (estimating MLB team values, led by the
NewYork Yankees at $832 million). See generally Carr & Cummins, supra note 12.
231. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 34, at 114 (citing recent MLB team sales, led by the
2002 sale of the Boston Red Sox for $700 million).
232. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-3; see also Declet, supra note 228, at 67-68.
233. Declet, supra note 228, at 68 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 128 (1978); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1945)).
234. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders I), 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156-57 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985).
235. Declet, supra note 228, at 70.
236. Id. at 157.
237. Id.
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substantial legal obstacle to condemning a professional sports
team.
D. Encourage Community Ownership
Nonetheless, a local government willing to tackle the issues in-
volved in setting professional sports ticket prices need not fight a
protracted and uncertain court battle to condemn the local profes-
sional sports team. Instead, it should seriously consider buying its
own team from a willing seller.
The Green Bay Packers present a model for community owner-
ship of a professional sports team. The Green Bay Football
Corporation took the reins from Curly Lambeau in 1923 when a
group of Green Bay businessman organized the team as a non-
profit corporation. 8 The first shares were sold for $5.2.9 In 1935,
the team reorganized and issued 300 shares of common stock.244
The team issued 10,000 more shares in 1950 for $25 per share. 45 In
1997, the team split existing stock 1000-to-i and issued approxi-
mately 120,000 new shares for $200 each, largely to local fans.242
Stockholders have limited rights, though, as the shares will never
pay a dividend and cannot be transferred, except to sell them back
to the team.243 But Green Bay shareholders have certain voting
rights, including the crucial right to approve any team relocation.4
Other professional sports teams have had limited public owner-
ship for short periods. 245 The Boston Celtics, Florida Panthers, and
Cleveland Indians once issued shares to the public. The Celtics
sold a 40% interest in its limited partnership to the public in
1986.246 The shares were traded on the NYSE and occasionally paid
238. Hartel, supra note 83, at 593.
239. Stroz, supra note 35, at 523.
240. Hartel, supra note 83, at 593.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 594; see also Genevieve EE. Birren, NFL vs. Sherman Act: How the NFL's Ban on
Public Ownership Violates FederalAntitrust Laws, 11 SPORTS LAw.J. 121, 130 (2004) (noting that
of the 120,010 shares, Green Bay sold 64,300 to Wisconsin residents and 16,700 to residents
of nearby Illinois, Minnesota, and Michigan); Stroz, supra note 35, at 524.
243. Hartel, supra note 83, at 594-95; see also Stroz, supra note 35, at 524.
244. Hartel, supra note 83, at 594; Stroz, supra note 35, at 524.
245. Of course, several professional sports teams are owned by publicly-held corpora-
tions of which the teams constitute a tiny fraction of the corporations' revenues. For
example, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., a Time Warner company (NYSE: TWX), owns
the Atlanta Braves; Tribune Company (NYSE: TRB) owns the Chicago Cubs; and Cablevision
Systems Corporation (NYSE: CVC) owns the New York Knicks and the New York Rangers. See
Cheffins, supra note 1, at 647-48; see also Stroz, supra note 35, at 146-47.
246. Bacon, supra note 55, at 148-50; see also Stroz, supra note 35, at 525.
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dividends to investors, but gave shareholders "virtually no say in
corporate operations., 247 The Celtics later reorganized into a pri-
vate limited partnership and a public limited partnership.248 Boston
Basketball Partners, a private limited liability corporation, bought
the private limited partnership in 2002 and the public limited
partnership in 2003.249 Likewise, the Florida Panthers held a public
offering for shares in Florida Panthers Holdings, Inc., in 1996.250
But the principal owner, H. Wayne Huizenga, continued to hold
more than 87% of the voting shares. 5' Shortly thereafter, the com-
pany began buying and developing resort properties, and the
hockey operations took a back seat to real estate development.
2
Florida Panthers Holdings, Inc., eventually became known as Boca
Resorts, Inc., and changed its stock ticker symbol from the hockey-
related PUCK to PAW to the "resort" abbreviation, RST.25' Boca Re-
sorts, Inc., sold the Florida Panthers to a private corporation, the
Florida Panthers Hockey Club, in 2001.254 The Cleveland Indians
sold 4,600,000 shares to the public at $15 per share in 1998.255 The
shares paid no dividend and extended no real control to share-
holders.2 6 The Cleveland Indians principal owner, Dick Jacobs,
sold the team to Larry Dolan in a cash-out merger in 2000, ending
the Cleveland Indians's public ownership.
257
Fans wishing to follow in the Packers's footsteps, and improve on
the Celtics, Panthers, and Indians limited success, could purchase a
professional sports team through a community-based public corpo-
ration. One commentator suggests a two-tiered initial public
offering, with an investment tier and a fan tier.25 8 The investment-
tier shares would pay a dividend, encouraging ownership by inves-
tors, but would not carry voting rights. 2 9 The fan-tier shares would
be reasonably priced and carry voting rights, but would not pay a
247. Bacon, supra note 55, at 149 (citing Scott C. Lascari, The Latest Revenue Generator:
Stock Sales by Professional Sports Franchises, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 445, 453 (1999)); see also Stroz,
supra note 35, at 525.
248. Cheffins, supra note 1, at 646.
249. Hoover's Fact Sheet, Boston Basketball Partners L.L.C., http://remium.hoovers.com/
subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?lD=107184 (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
250. Bacon, supra note 55, at 150.
251. Stroz, supra note 35, at 527.
252. Cheffins, supra note 1, at 647; see also Bacon, supra note 55, at 150; Stroz, supra note
35, at 526.
253. Stroz, supra note 35, at 526-27; see also Cheffins, supra note 1, at 647.
254. Hoover's Fact Sheet, Florida Panthers Hockey Club, http://premium.hoovers.com/
subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?lD=104053 (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
255. Bacon, supra note 55, at 151.
256. Id. at 151-52.
257. Stroz, supra note 35, at 528-29.
258. Hartel, supra note 83, at 597.
259. Id. at 597-98.
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dividend.2 0 Also, any one fan could purchase a set number of fan-
tier shares.26 ' This arrangement may be able to raise the substantial
capital investment required to purchase a professional sports team,
while securing community control of the team.62
Numerous barriers exist, however, to forming a publicly-owned
corporation to buy a professional sports team. The process of pre-
paring a public offering is time consuming and costly, as expenses
may consume ten percent or more of the IPO proceeds. 6s Investors
may not flock to the IPO, as a professional sports team offers rela-
tively limited opportunities for the growth or expansion needed to
continually drive share prices. Indeed, the Green Bay Packers
could not sell out their 1997 offering, and shares in the Boston
Celtics, Cleveland Indians, and Florida Panthers had lackluster
performance.26 ' Public ownership entails onerous disclosure
requirements and accountability to shareholders.266 Also, a publicly-
held professional sports team is in the unenviable position of having
to serve two masters, as " [t]he best interests of the fans and the best
interests of shareholders in a franchise are strikingly divergent."
267
Most troubling for our purposes, a publicly-held corporation's fidu-
ciary duty to its shareholders may actually force it to maximize
2681
revenues by increasing ticket prices.
Another option to obtain community ownership of a professional
sports team is for the local government itself to buy the team. No
local government currently owns a major league sports team, al-
though Franklin County, Ohio, owns the Columbus Clippers minor
league baseball team. 69 In theory, operating a professional sports
team should pose no extraordinary burden on a local government,
as local governments already own and operate professional sports
stadiums, as well as other complex public facilities like train stations
260. Id. at 598.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 596-99 (arguing that a team could raise $700 million by selling three million
investment shares at $100 per share and ten million fan shares at $40 per share).
263. Cheffins, supra note 1, at 660-61.
264. Stroz, supra note 35, at 540 (citing Michael J. Santoli, How to Own Your Own Sports
Tean, WALL ST.J., Sept. 27, 1996, at B17).
265. Stroz, supra note 35, at 524, 543 (noting that the Packers expected to sell 400,000
shares but sold only 120,000, and observing that shares in all three teams floundered at or
below $11 "during a period of time when the stock market in general has seen unprece-
dented growth"); see also Bacon, supra note 55, at 140 ("[A]ttempts by sports franchises to
sell stock to the public have resulted in mediocre success for team owners and poor invest-
ment returns for shareholders.").
266. Cheffins, supra note 1, at 658-59; see also Bacon, supra note 55, at 159-62.
267. Stroz, supra note 35, at 521.
268. Cheffins, supra note 1, at 677.
269. ZIMBALIST, supra note 31, at 139; see alsoJoseph M. Santry, The History of the Co-
lumbus Clippers, http://clippersbaseball.com/clippers/about/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
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and airports. The primary objection to a local government buying
a professional sports team-the high price tag-is a red herring. °
Local governments already gladly spend $200 million to $400 mil-
lion to build new stadiums.2 71 Some cities spend considerably more
on professional sports. The City of Indianapolis has spent more
than $3 billion since 1974 to build stadiums and attract profes-
sional sporting events.272 Local governments poised to commit
hundreds of millions of dollars to a professional sports stadium
deal might consider whether their money would be better spent on
buying the professional sports team instead. MLB teams may be the
most attractive purchases, as at least six MLB teams have been sold
for less than $200 million since 1999.273 A government-owned team
could play in the local government's existing stadium and be sub-
ject to direct community control, keeping the team from raising
ticket prices, replacing affordable seating with premium seating,
relocating, or otherwise harming its relationship with its local
fans.274
Once a local government decides its stadium construction
budget is better spent on buying a professional sports team, the
next obstacle comes from league policies against public ownership.
The NBA, NHL, and MLB allow public ownership in theory, but
only if one primary shareholder retains ultimate voting control. 5
The NFL, by contrast, forbids public ownership of its teams, other
than the Green Bay Packers. 76 The NFL policy is unwritten, but
follows from several provisions of the NFL Constitution.277 NFL
Rule 3.2(a) flatly prohibits nonprofit companies from owning a
team. 27  Other rules require detailed financial statements from
each person holding an ownership interest in the team and permit
270. Hartel, supra note 83, at 602-03. "[Slome cities ... are not willing to bear the fi-
nancial burdens associated with subsidizing the acquisition of an NFL franchise." Id. (citing
Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National Football League, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 473, 487 (1997)). Team ownership by community-based, publicly-held cor-
porations is recommended to overcome the "'general' opposition to whatever amount of
public funding may be necessary to acquire a team." Id. at 602.
271. See supra Part II.A.I.
272. Sepulveda, supra note 79, at 144-45.
273. Greenberg, supra note 34, at 114-15 (noting the 1999 sale of the Cincinnati Reds
for $183 million, the 2002 sale of the Florida Marlins for $158 million, the 2000 sale of the
Toronto BlueJays for $140 million, the 2000 sale of the then-Anaheim Angels for $140 mil-
lion, the 2002 sale of the Montreal Expos for $120 million, and the 2000 sale of the Kansas
City Royals for the bargain price of $96 million).
274. See Hartel, supra note 83, at 600-02 (noting that community-based ownership of a
team could be a check on relocation and premium stadium seating).
275. Bacon, supra note 55, at 144-45; see also Cheffins, supra note 1, at 657.
276. Birren, supra note 242, at 121-22.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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the league to approve or reject any proposed team owner .2 9 Billy
Sullivan, then-owner of the New England Patriots, challenged this
policy in 1987 when the NFL blocked his plan to sell 49% of the
team to the public via a stock offering.280 On appeal, the First Cir-
cuit agreed Sullivan presented substantial evidence that the NFL's
policy caused antitrust injury, but vacated Sullivan's jury verdict
due to the trial court's various procedural errors.28 ' Thus, the First
Circuit's discussion of the NFL policy may be dicta. 82 Subsequent
legislation to formally extinguish the NFL policy against publicr•283
ownership was unsuccessful. The NFL policy consequently is still
in effect, albeit on shaky legal footing.
CONCLUSION
Professional sports ticket prices have skyrocketed, benefiting
owners, players, and corporate sponsors, but shutting the regular
fan out of the game. Conventional wisdom blames the soaring cost
of professional sports ticket prices on the free market or greedy
players, but neither excuse stands up to analysis. Professional
sports teams do not set ticket prices in a market that is "free," be-
cause they depend on billion-dollar public subsidies and
preferential legal treatment, such as stadium deals, tax-exempt sta-
dium bonds, antitrust exemptions, protected monopoly status, and
tax loopholes. And player salaries have, at most, a weak indirect
influence on ticket prices. Professional sports team owners will
charge as much for tickets as they can, whether player salaries go
up or down.
Thus, no reason exists not to use legal reform to address the ticket
price problem. But federal oversight of professional sports ticket
prices is undesirable and unworkable, either through direct regula-
tion of professional sports or by basing continued preferential legal
treatment on affordable ticket prices. Local control of professional
sports ticket prices is more feasible, but not by taking professional
sports teams through eminent domain. A condemnation action
279. Id. at 122 (citing NFL Rules 3.3(A) (1)-(2), 3.3(C), and 3.5).
280. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (1st Cir. 1994).
281. Id. at 1100-02, 1106-13.
282. Birren, supra note 242, at 123.
283. Hartel, supra note 83, at 592 (discussing the Give Fans a Chance Act of 1997, H.R.
590, 105th Cong. (1997), proposed by U.S. Representative Earl Blumenauer of Oregon); see
also Wang, supra note 53, at 821-23 (noting that no action has been taken on the Give Fans a
Chance Act since 1997, strongly suggesting that the bill died in committee).
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would undoubtedly result in a costly court battle and would likely
fail in the face of the dormant commerce clause.
The most promising legal avenue to lowering professional sports
ticket prices is to encourage local ownership. Although local fans
might form a publicly-held corporation to obtain community own-
ership of a professional sports team, the necessary IPO may not
attract sufficient investor interest. Ironically, a professional sports
team owned by a community-based, publicly-held corporation may
be forced to raise ticket prices to satisfy analyst and shareholder
demand for increased revenue.
Instead, local governments should contemplate buying profes-
sional sports teams. Local government ownership, unlike the
federal options, does not require an unlikely national consensus to
regulate professional sports or a nationwide determination of ap-
propriate professional sports ticket prices. Unlike condemning a
professional sports team through eminent domain, local govern-
ment ownership does not pit the city or county against the team, as
the team owner would be a willing seller. Unlike forming a com-
munity-based, publicly-held corporation, local government
ownership is not subject to investor whims or shareholder demands
for increased revenue.
All that is required for a local government to start the process of
buying a professional sports team is the political will to do so, and
funding similar to that required for stadium construction or reno-
vation. Once a willing owner is found, the local government would
need to defeat the league policies restricting public ownership.
This is a much easier legal battle to fight than a condemnation ac-
tion, in light of the First Circuit's analysis in Sullivan and the
consistent outcry from legal commentators against the league's
policies.8 4 As such, and as compared against the other possible op-
tions, encouraging local government ownership of professional
sports teams may be the best means to ensure fans can once again
afford to take their families out to the ballgame.
284. See Birren, supra note 242, at 138-39; see also Hartel, supra note 83, at 627.
[VOL. 39:1
